overpowering resistance of corporations to regulation. We strain to find ways for our weakened government institutions -from Congress to the president to the career civil service -to steer the nation out of these blind alleys and back on to the high road.
As the chapters in this volume argue, the reforms necessary to meet these grave challenges must go "beyond environmental law" to a concep tual plane where even the most basic and routine assumptions are revis ited. To re-create the atmosphere of revolutionary change that gave birth to modern environmental protection, we must push beyond incremental tinkering. New ideas must be incubated, embraced, enacted, and imple and that all important problems have been identified. All of these con cepts are no longer valid, if they ever were.2
Grappling with these kinds of problems will require extractmg ourselves from the outmoded framework of the existing constitutional foundation for environmental law -namely article I, section 8, of the Constitution, com monly known as the Commerce Clause, which reads: "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."3 The arguably fatal flaw in this section of the document is that the most common usage of the word "commerce" is the "exchange or buying and selling of commodi ties."4 As Congress expanded the federal government's reach into areas of public law long dominated by the states, the Supreme Court kept pace, broadening its interpretation of the Commerce Clause to encompass activ ity that could potentially affect the economy, whether or not those activi ties actually involved the exchange of money.5 This jurisprudence may be broad enough at the moment to encompass the Legacy Act and other nextgeneration efforts, although in recent years, the Supreme Court has begun to put the brakes on its historically expansive approach to the ambit of fed eral authority in relationship to the states. But as the transactions governed by the law -for example, mining today that will make land use unsustain able in thirty years, deployment of nanotechnology today that will cause disruption of ecosystems a hundred years hence, or carbon emissions that occurred twenty years ago but will trigger climate changes that threaten our children's children -Commerce Clause justifications appear increas ingly fragile and even begin to teeter on the edge of failing of their own weight.
Rooting environmental law in the analysis of its economic effects has also weakened its effectiveness to an extraordinarily corrosive extent. The long-standing assumption that the pros and cons of environmental policy must be rationalized in terms of money reached its apex three decades ago, with the militant application of cost-benefit analysis to regulatory decisions.
Supporters of America's strong laws reacted instinctively to these develop ments by attacking that methodology on its own terms.6 But it did not occur to us to think about whether our tacit acceptance of the Commerce Clause as the constitutional foundation for environmental and other health and safety laws was the genesis of these developments. Although the Clause does not lead inexorably to reliance on cost-benefit analysis, the parallel between the two is striking. Cost-benefit analysis excludes nonmarket val ues that are not easily quantified, just as the Commerce Clause focuses on the economic implications of a decision to the exclusion of other, trans cending concerns, such as the protection of future generations' health and welfare.
At first and maybe even at second blush, my reasoning will appear to push against the strong tide of immutable constitutional theory when reformers of environmental law have much more pressing and immediate work to do. But I am convinced that this apparently quixotic exercise is well worth the effort. The widespread tendency to employ economics as the primary lens through which we justify health, safety, and environmental regulation has turned the missions of the major environmental laws on thenheads, compelling us to consider whether the marketplace will address the problem, as opposed to whether and to what extent the government has responsibility for protecting public health and the environment.
Americans count on their government to prevent a growing number of international disasters -from pandemics to global terrorism to water short ages -and do not conceive of these protections as justified only with respect to "free market," economic concerns. Not only did the framers of the Con stitution recognize these expectations; they embraced them in article I, sec tion 8, which authorizes Congress to "provide for the general Welfare" by taxing, spending, and making all "necessary and proper" laws.7 If commerce at its most fundamental level is comprised of the exchange of commodities and money, then the term refers to a "marketplace'7 at a specific point in time. Yet ideas like preserving natural resources for future generations or otherwise preventing pollution that could harm our children and their chil dren demand a significantly more attenuated frame of temporal reference than has applied to the more immediate interventions thai characterize much of environmental law. Zones Act of 1990. In a tense, 5^4 majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the Act had "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise" and that it did not contain any self-limiting jurisdictional provision ensuring its limited application to activities that sub stantially affected commerce.12 Justice Breyer's dissent gave full-throated voice to the liberal justices' view that the opinion was a startling departure from precedent. Chiding the majority for shifting direction on the Court's long-standing and expansive definitions of commerce, he warned that its effort to distinguish between economic and noneconomic activity would not only create turmoil in the lower courts but also involve judges in secondguessing Congress in ways that exceeded their appropriate constitutional role. 13 Despite these warnings, the dissent's supporters in the academy and in them lack any nexus to commerce as the term is commonly understood, and conversely, Congress lacks any authority to burden present genera tions with this imaginary debt to the future. Admittedly, parsing the tem poral dimensions of federal statutes to ensure that they benefit only people alive today could prove an intellectual exercise that makes debates over intra-versus interstate effects look like child's play. Yet it is easy to imag ine Justice Scalia warming to such work.
From this broader perspective, we can discern Commerce Clause ideas as a fault line that will dog all efforts to address emerging environmental problems. Reliance on the federal authority to promote marketplace vigor sets the stage for the supposed trade-off between jobs and the environment and between public health and prosperity. Democrats insist that we can find better ways to protect the environment, therefore sacrificing less eco nomic growth.27 Republicans claim that environmental regulations waste money, stifle small business, and cripple the nation's competitiveness.2* The common ground for both arguments is the view that environmental protec tion and the economy are in a relationship that demands their trade-off against each other. The proposition that we owe it to future generations to preserve natural resources is likely to prove exceptionally controversial.
In fact, opponents will argue that, when we enhance monetary wealth by consuming resources, we provide the economic resources needed by future generations to buy their way out of any irreversible environmental trouble.
Or, to phrase the argument another way, resources in and of themselves have no value until they are bought and sold. Refraining from buying and selling them has absolutely nothing to do with encouraging the promotion of commerce, which the national government has always done by stabiliz ing markets, not by enforcing fanciful prohibitions against market trans actions.
Professor Flournoy refers to these arguments as the spend-down ethic, explaining that they implicitly reject any moral or ethical commitment to preserve resources for future generations (see Chapter 1 in this volume).
Instead, this ethic posits that ownership of resources and control over how rapidly they are consumed are the sole prerogative of those now living on the planet. Under Professor Flournoy's analysis, unless we take decisive action to fundamentally modify our patterns of consumption, the spenddown ethic will win the day. And it is difficult to articulate an economic reason for making ourselves uncomfortable. Rather, the motivation must come from an ethical sense that we must be responsible stewards for our children's future. And, as it turns out, the framers had similar ideas in mind when they gave Congress aspirational, or affirmative, authority.
III. Safeguarding the General Welfare
We The argument that the federal government's efforts to deal with long-term threats to public health and the environment should be lifted from the con straints of the Commerce Clause and placed under the umbrella of the national government's efforts to promote the general welfare is best sup ported by the Supreme Court's line of cases confirming the states' police power to combat comparable threats. At the time of the American Revo lution, this concept was captured in the Latin phrase salus populi supreme lex est, or "the safety of the people is the supreme law." States have a long and noble history of regulating practices that could threaten public health, begmning as early as the 1700s, when smallpox inoculations were common in the New England colonies, extending through the sanitarian movement in America's major cities during, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, covering the campaign to eradicate polio during the 1950s and up to the present day when the threat of AIDS has challenged their capacity to the breaking point.29
The Slaughter-House Cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1872 typ ify this jurisprudence.30 At issue was a Louisiana law granting a monopoly to a single slaughterhouse on the grounds that it would be easier to con trol the practices that led such places to spread disease through the careless disposal of animal carcasses and other wastes. The Court treated the case as a showdown between state police-power prerogatives and the recently enacted Fourteenth Amendment grant of "privileges and immunities" to citizens of the United States31 -in this instance, the chosen slaughterhouse's competitors and their privilege to continue in business. Owners of compet ing slaughterhouses challenged the law, alleging that their privileges and [i]n dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the Legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in order that there may be suit able protection of health and safety, and that peace and good order may be promoted through regulations designed to insure wholesome condi tions of work and freedom from oppression.39
Similarly, in Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, the Court upheld a Missouri statute allowing workers to be absent from their places of employment for four hours between the opening and closing of election polls:
Our recent decisions make plain that we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare....
[T]he state legislatures have constitutional authority to experiment with new techniques; they are entitled to their own standard of the public welfare; they may within extremely broad limits control practices in the business-labor field, so long as specific constitutional prohibitions are not violated and so long as conflicts with valid and controlling federal laws are avoided.40
In a series of articles notable as much for their careful study of his tory as for their insightful constitutional analysis, Professor Parmet argues that this reluctance to expand the concept of a police power to include widespread and chronic threats to public health, especially where work ers were involved, served to deconstitutionalize public health law. The phrase saluspopuli supreme lex was dropped from judicial lexicon, and the Supreme Court "abandoned the quest for the boundaries between the pub lic and private spheres of authority."41 No one lamented this subtle shift at the time, in large measure because state and federal legislatures were given ample running room by the courts to enact all manner of public health pro grams, from wage and hour laws to occupational safety laws to environmen tal regulations.
Professor Parmet concludes that, while it may be difficult to document the tangible effects of deconstitutionauzation, the cumulative effect of these decisions is to take the focus off government's legitimate and affirmative Similarly, the next generation of public health and environmental laws will be compelled to deal with global threats. The national government has long dominated domestic regulation through a cooperative federalism system that defines the terms and conditions of environmental protection through federal statutes but allows states to volunteer for the responsibil ity of implementing those rules. Among the strongest principles embodied in that system is that federal standards set the floor -as opposed to the ceiling -of protection and that states can go further if they deem additional protections to be necessary. One statute, the Clean Air Act, even goes so far as to allow California to impose more stringent rules on motor vehicles sold in interstate commerce because the state has acute air-quality problems.
But this principle is beginning to unravel in the climate-change context, with many large fossil fuel producers and users demanding preemption of state authority to curb greenhouse gases.45 Ironically, the most prominent argu ment these parties make is that the federal government has superior ability to combat this global crisis, which threatens both public health and natural The federal government spends considerable sums each year to man age federal lands, deploying park rangers and firefighting teams, main taining the national parks, securing the borders from private-sector incur sions, building roads, supervising the preservation of wildlife, and so on.
These substantial financial commitments are probably sufficient to satisfy the Butler test as applied to the core requirements of the Legacy Act, which would mandate planning to ensure the long-term sustainability of natural resources located on federally owned lands. However, as discussed at the outset, the Legacy Act would also require that proposed action be aban doned or modified if analysis showed that it would threaten long-term sustainability of federally owned natural resources. The power to block such actions should reasonably extend to actions that take place on privately owned land if they would have comparable effects. Opponents of the Act could argue that, unless the federal government subsidized the costs of these consequences, the new law should be read as purely regulatory with respect to private conduct and therefore not involving the exercise of taxing or spending authority. Any number of other legislative formulations that seek to protect future generations could raise comparable questions. Putting the arguments together, then, the strong advantages of ground ing the protection of public health and natural resources in the concept of the government's affirmative responsibilities to safeguard the quality of life in a civil society would best be served by recognition of a federal police Acknowledging that the facts of the case elicited "natural sympathy," the majority noted that "before yielding to that impulse, it is well to remem ber once again that the harm was inflicted not by the State of Wisconsin, but by Joshua's father."64 Because the county had no "constitutional duty" to protect Joshua, its failure to do so, "although calamitous in hindsight,"
is not a violation of the Due Process Clause.65 Justice Brennan, writing in dissent for Justices Marshall and Blackmun, significantly did not chal lenge the majority's view that "the Due Process Clause as construed by our prior cases creates no right to basic government services."66 But, he added, Joshua's case did not present that question. Rather, Joshua suffered grave injury after the county had already taken action on more than one occasion to place the small child under the control of his father, thereby subjecting him to the possibility of abuse. If their actions were arbitrary, then Joshua and his mother should recover, and the case should be remanded to the trial court for examination of that issue. Given the extreme circumstances of the case, and the enormous pressure that state and local governments can exert on courts by warning of the unforeseen consequences of creating affirmative rights, it is difficult to imagine that a majority of the Court would reverse this position any time soon.
Conditioning the argument for recognition of a federal police power on the acknowledgment that the Constitution grants Congress authority to take action but does not confer on individual citizens a judicially enforce able right to such protections has the great advantage of neutralizing a cen tral assertion of the originalists. It would be a bad thing if unelected fed eral judges undertook the difficult job of deciding when and how to deploy the government's limited resources to combat such extensive threats. But If judges are not the sole source of constitutional interpretation and should not control -literally or by implication -how other branches read the Con stitution's affirmative grants of authority, how should Congress interpret its responsibilities under the General Welfare Clause? Professor West has argued that the Constitution creates positive obligations to pass laws that will protect citizens against environmental threats.68 She points to the writ ings of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Thomas Paine, and more recently, John Rawls in defining the nature and scope of those responsibilities. She accepts the DeShaney holding as definitive at the same time that she dis misses it as irrelevant to Congress's quest to define its affirmative role. Professor West further argues that the American people believe in the idea that Congress has affirmative duties and are far more concerned about its failure to carry out those duties than they are about the government's inter ference with the individual rights that so preoccupy constitutional scholars:
The worry increasingly voiced by American citizens, particularly in Katrina's wake, is that our domestic politics and the state that is its prod uct have become too wan, not too voracious, even as our foreign poli cies have become monstrously outsized. Our shrunken state, incapable of either preparing for or mounting an adequate response to a hurricane, incapable of repairing deteriorating bridges or crumbling schools, inca pable of responding to public health crises or to a dangerously warming climate, seems, to many of our co-citizens, to be in breach of the most basic, fundamental duties central to a sensible construal of virtually any social compact. Thus, where lawyers look at our government and see the "empire of force" of which Weil spoke, in violation of any number of constitutional norms, many of our co-citizens see, at best, sloth -an empire that is failing or willfully refusing to live up to its most basic obli gations.69
Time will tell whether a Democratic Congress and the Obama administra tion will respond to these deep-sealed perceptions of government inadequa cies or whether they will shrink from these challenges in the face of strident charges that protections will cost too much and drown our children in debt.
We may think we cannot afford to deal with climate change and sustainability, but our children almost certainly will not be able to afford to confront these problems if we fail.
Conclusion
Despite their implicit commitment to precedent and a stable interpreta tion of the Constitution, General Meese and other originalists would be If we stick with Commerce Clause analysis, giving economists free rein to forecast future markets in commodities like clean air and clean water, we can justify incremental but significant changes. The problem with these projections is that the economic value of natural resources left in trust for future generations diminishes to zero over time. Consequently, traditional economic analysis militates against preserving environmental quality for future generations. Supporters of proposals to protect natural resources will seldom win a numbers game unless they limit their preservation goals to a severely constrained short term.
If, in contrast, we read the Constitution as embodying additional val ues beyond preservation of the marketplace, the horizon of change may well be extended beyond where we already see. The National Environ mental Legacy Act and similar breakthrough laws, all of which are nec essary to avert the worst consequences of climate change, could be based on the principle of preserving the general welfare that was embraced by the framers and that remains central to Americans' understanding of the rule of law today. Had the justices serving on the Supreme Court in the postindustrialization era been less timid, or less focused on shielding the mar ketplace from government interference, they might well have considered whether the Constitution's text provided additional authority to protect public health, safety, and the environment.
